I Introduction
Liquidity is one of the most important attributes of bond markets. Several papers show that both, level of liquidity and liquidity risk, have a strong impact on bond prices leading to higher yields for less liquid bonds (for a survey, see Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen 2005) . Although the existence of the illiquidity premium is beyond doubt, it is still unclear how this premium depends on the maturity of the bond.
Understanding the term structure of illiquidity premia is an important task for several reasons. (i) Since a bond's maturity deterministically changes over time, investors are forced to consider maturity-specific illiquidity premia within dynamic trading strategies for single bonds. This is obvious when looking at the well-documented on-the-run/off-the-run cycle, but holds more generally.
(ii) If illiquidity premia depend on time to maturity, investors' portfolio choice problems are strongly affected.
1 (iii) There are also implications for the management of liquidity risk. If illiquidity premia for different maturities are driven by different risk factors, appropriate hedging instruments differ accordingly across maturities.
Our paper contributes in two ways to a better understanding of the term structure of illiquidity premia. Our first contribution is to provide insights into the dynamics of the term structure of bond market illiquidity premia using an 1 Gârleanu (2009) provides a theoretical analysis of portfolio choice problems in illiquid markets and shows that the liquidity level indeed has a strong impact on asset holdings.
ideally suited data set. The illiquidity premium is typically hard to measure because bond yields are jointly driven by three main factors: risk-free rate, default premium, and illiquidity premium. To separate the effects of the riskfree rate, the default premium, and the illiquidity premium on bond yields, we use the zero-coupon bond yield difference between two bond market segments:
German government bonds (BUNDs) and German Pfandbriefe. These bond market segments only differ with respect to their degree of liquidity. Thus, the yield difference reflects the illiquidity premium of the Pfandbrief market as compared to the BUND market for bonds of different maturities, i.e., the term structure of illiquidity premia. Using this data set, we show that the shape of the term structure varies heavily over time. There are periods of increasing term structures, but also periods in which the term structure is flat or even decreasing. We also document a strict separation between the short end and the long end of the term structure of illiquidity premia. The correlation is almost zero and we find no spill-over effects across different maturities. This result suggests that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure.
Our second main contribution is to identify economic factors which determine level and form of the term structure of illiquidity premia. We propose a stylized theoretical model which is, nevertheless, flexible enough to capture the observed dynamics of the term structure of illiquidity premia. The economic rationale of the model is straightforward. The term structure of illiquidity premia is determined by the investors' demand for liquidity. This demand is driven by the risk of being forced to sell bonds. If the current risk is unusually high in comparison with the expected risk in the long run, the expected per period trading costs of short-term bonds are higher than those of long-term bonds and the term structure of illiquidity premia is downward sloping. The opposite is true if the current liquidation risk is below its long-run mean. The model has two main implications: (i) The long end of the term structure is determined by the long-term liquidation risk of the investor whereas the short end is driven by her current trading needs.
(ii) The influence of long-term risk increases with the time to maturity of the bond whereas the influence of the short-term risk decreases. In the empirical part of the paper we provide support for both hypotheses: While the short end of the term structure of illiquidity premia is driven by short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook.
The short-term liquidation risk becomes more important for the illiquidity premium the shorter the maturity of a bond is. Long-term economic prospects, however, gain importance for bonds with longer maturities.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. The theoretical part of our paper contributes to the scarce literature on how illiquidity premia should behave across maturities. Ericsson and Renault (2006) propose a stylized version of a search market model that predicts a decreasing term structure of illiquidity premia. Bond holders suffer from random liquidity shocks forcing them to sell the bond prior to maturity at a discount. However, the shape is mainly driven by the possibility of selling voluntarily under favorable condi-tions. This option renders future liquidity shocks less important and leads to illiquidity premia that decrease with time to maturity. Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) apply Longstaff's (1995) idea that the liquidity advantage equals the payoff of a lookback option to bond markets. Their model predicts a humpedshaped term structure of illiquidity premia. For very short maturities the disadvantage from a temporary trading restriction is virtually irrelevant but it increases with time to maturity. The subsequent decrease occurs because the temporary trading restrictions become relatively less important when maturity goes to infinity. Whereas these models allow only for one specific form of the term structure, our model is flexible enough to capture the variation of the term structure over time. It traces the form of the term structure back to the liquidation risk faced by the investors.
Related empirical literature provides evidence on illiquidity premia for different bond market segments. First, there is the burgeoning literature on default-risky bonds such as the recent corporate bond studies of Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Lui, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006) , Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) , De Jong and Driessen (2007) , Dieck-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2009) and others. They typically have to rely on rather strong assumptions to separate credit risk from liquidity risk. In contrast, our data allows for a much cleaner test of the effects of illiquidity on bond yields. Second, there is a literature concentrating on essentially risk-free bonds using predominantly U.S. Treasury securities. Different studies compare liquid Treasury Bills with more illiquid Treasury Notes (e.g., Mendelson 1991, Kamara 1994) and liquid on-the-run Treasuries with more illiquid off-the-run
Treasuries (e.g., Warga 1992 , Krishnamurthy 2002 , Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath 2005 . In contrast to our study, they do not focus on the entire term structure of illiquidity premia. Evidence on the term structure of illiquidity premia is scarce.
2 Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) test their theoretical model, but the empirical evidence is weak. Longstaff (2004) looks at yield differences between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds. He finds a U-shaped term structure, but his results are based on only six long-term Refcorp bonds. In contrast to these papers we study the dynamic linkage between different parts of the term structure using a large sample of bonds varying only with respect to liquidity and identify maturity-specific determinants of illiquidity premia.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides information on our data set. First results on the shape and dynamics of the term structure of illiquidity premia are provided in Section III. Section IV deals with the economic determinants of the term structure. Here, we present a stylized model of the term structure of illiquidity premia and test its main implications. Section V concludes the paper.
2 In an interesting study, Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2008) our research period starts in January 2000. As the end of the data period, we choose May 2007, which excludes the period of the subprime crisis.
To condense the term structure information we use the Nelson and Siegel (1987) approach. It allows us to characterize the entire term structure through four parameters only (β 0t , β 1t , β 2t , τ t ). Within the Nelson-Siegel framework, a zero bond yield at time t for time to maturity T is given as
The Nelson-Siegel parameters can be interpreted in terms of a factor representation. β 0t , β 1t , and β 2t are the factors and τ t affects the factor loadings. To estimate the parameters for the BUND and the Pfandbrief market, we select end of month yields with maturities of 3 and 6 months and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 , and 15 years for each market from the Bundesbank data.
Following standard practice as in Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2006) , we restrict τ t to be constant over time and, furthermore, to be identical in the BUND market and the Pfandbrief market. This assumption implies that factor loadings are the same in both markets and that the magnitude of the factors can be directly compared. Estimation is carried out by minimizing the sum of squared yield differences over all selected maturities and both markets. This procedure delivers monthly parameter estimates for the BUND market (β a maximum factor loading of the β 2t factor at about four years to maturity.
The factors are closely related to different segments of the term structure. β 0t determines the level of the long end of the term structure. Therefore, we call β 0t the long-term factor. β 1t is a slope factor that characterizes the difference between short-term and long-term yields. β 0t + β 1t determines the short end of the term structure. Therefore, we call β 0t + β 1t the short-term factor. β 2t is a shape factor that mainly drives medium-term yields. Due to the hump-shaped form of the corresponding factor loading, a positive value of β 2t moves the term structure towards a hump shape and a negative value towards a U-shape.
The development of the estimated long-term factor β 0 , the short-term factor β 0 + β 1 , and the shape factor β 2 for the BUND and the Pfandbrief market is shown in Figure 1 .
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ] Figure 1 shows that the two markets are clearly linked and the factors move closely together. However, there are differences between the factors of the two markets. The short-term factor and the long-term factor of the Pfandbrief segment are always above the respective factors of the Government segment, indicating a positive illiquidity premium at the short end and the long end of the term structure of illiquidity premia. The shape factor of the Pfandbrief segment is below that of the BUND segment most of the time, leading to a reduction of the illiquidity premium for medium-term maturities.
III Dynamics of the Term Structure
Given the parameter estimates for the two market segments, the term structure of illiquidity premia is easily obtained. The parameters Long t ≡ β
, and Shape t ≡ β
are the long-term factor, the short-term factor, and the shape factor of the term structure of illiquidity premia, respectively. The long-term (short-term) factor measures the illiquidity premium at the long (short) end of the term structure and the shape factor affects predominantly the medium-term illiquidity premium.
As a first indication of the level and slope of the term structure of illiquidity premia, we calculate the average premia of one-year bonds and 15-years bonds over all months in the data period. The resulting premia are 29 bp and 40 bp respectively, which implies an average slope of 11 bp.
To get a more detailed view on the evolution of the term structure, we present the term structures for each month in Figure 2 . The figure clearly indicates a strong variation in the level and in the form of the term structure.
[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
We observe increasing term structures of illiquidity premia, decreasing ones, U-shaped curves, and occasionally hump-shaped ones. The illiquidity premia are positive at all times for all maturities, but the level varies greatly.
Illiquidity premia at the short and at the long end seem to vary over time in different ways. This phenomenon becomes more evident in Figure 3 which shows the development of the short-term premium (Short t ) and the long-term premium (Long t ).
[ Insert Figure 3 about here ] In the following, we focus on the dynamic linkage between the short, long, and shape factor. There might be spillover effects, as documented by Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2008) . For US government bonds, they show that liquidity shocks at the short end of the term structure are transmitted to medium-term and longer maturities in later periods. To investigate whether similar lead-lag effects exist for our illiquidity premia, we estimate an unrestricted VAR-model.
where ǫ s t , ǫ sh t , and ǫ l t denote error terms. The superscripts s, sh, and l stand for short, shape, and long, respectively. The VAR-model is specified in levels to capture possible level relations between the three factors. Information criteria (AIC and SIC) suggest a lag length of one. As we want to allow for a potential influence of past changes in illiquidity premia, a lag length of two is chosen.
Estimation results are presented in Table 1 .
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] by the impulse response functions derived from the VAR-model. For example, a one-standard-deviation shock in the short-term premium (about 9 bp) leads to a response in the long-term premium of at most only 2 bp over the following months.
IV Economic Drivers of the Term Structure
The descriptive empirical results derived thus far pose a challenge to existing theories. The term structures are hardly ever humped-shaped as predicted from the models of Longstaff (1995) and Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) 
A Stylized Model
Consider a default-free pure discount bond paying one unit at maturity T .
This bond is illiquid in the sense that trading the bond causes trading costs.
The bond is held by risk-neutral investors who face random liquidity shocks, as in Ericsson and Renault (2006) or He and Xiong (2010) . If a liquidity shock occurs at time t, the bond owner has to sell the bond and to pay the trading costs c t that are a constant fraction c of an otherwise identical but perfectly liquid bond b liq (t, T ):
where r denotes the risk-free interest rate. After the trade, the new holder of the bond might also face a random liquidity shock which would force her to
sell to yet another investor. Therefore, the current price b ill (0, T ) reflects the expected total trading costs that current and future bondholders have to pay until maturity:
E 0 (C) is the time T value of the total trading costs expected at time zero. To calculate E 0 (C), we assume that liquidity shocks can occur at discrete points in time t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The probability for a shock at time t is denoted by q t .
The probabilities q t , t = 1, . . . , T , are random variables from the perspective of time zero, and the current probability q 0 is known. The time T value of the expected total trading costs is given as
To keep the model simple, we assume that q t follows a discrete-time first-order autoregressive process
whereq t is a stochastic long-term mean and 1 > α ≥ 0 denotes the corresponding mean-reversion parameter. The current value of the long-term mean,q 0 , is known and we assume that its dynamics evolves according to the random walk.q
The innovations ǫ t and u t are zero-mean random variables with a joint distribution that ensures probabilities between zero and one. Given the processes (8) and (9), the expected value of q t is
and the time T value of the expected total trading costs results in
Obviously, compared to an otherwise identical, but perfectly liquid bond, the price discount of the illiquid bond is e −rT E 0 (C). The resulting return premium due to illiquidity, premium(0, T ), is the difference between the yield to maturities of the illiquid and the liquid bond:
For different maturity dates T , equation (12) describes the term structure of illiquidity premia.
The trading costs parameter c is a pure scaling factor of the term structure reflecting the liquidity difference between liquid and illiquid bonds with identical maturity. Since c does not depend on time to maturity, the functional form of the term structure is not driven by maturity dependent liquidity differences between the markets. The functional form is solely determined by the maturity dependent liquidity demand of investors which is reflected in the bracket term in equation (12). For all maturities, the illiquidity premium is a weighted sum of the current probability q 0 of facing a liquidity shock and the expected long-term probabilityq 0 . The higher the probabilities of a shock, the more valuable liquidity and the higher the illiquidity premium is. The weights of the current (q 0 ) and the long-term probability (q 0 ) depend on the bond maturity T .
At the long end of the term structure of illiquidity premia (T → ∞), the premium converges to cq 0 , i.e., the expected long-term risk of facing a liquidity shock drives the long end of the term structure. In contrast, the short end (T → 0) is solely determined by the current risk of facing a liquidity shock.
The premium converges to c q 0 at the short end.
For the middle part of the term structure, the relation between time to maturity of a bond and the weight of the long-term risk depends on the mean reversion parameter α. The smaller α, the more quickly the probability that a shock occurs, q t , reverts to the long-term probabilityq t and, therefore, the more important the long-term probability is. If there is an immediate mean reversion (α = 0), only the expected long-term probability matters and the illiquidity spread is cq 0 . In contrast, only the current probability matters if there is no mean reversion at all (α → 1 ). For 0 < α < 1 the long-term probability is more important the longer the maturity of a bond is. This property follows immediately from the fact that
Thus, the term structure of illiquidity premia can be flat (q 0 =q 0 ), strictly increasing (q 0 <q 0 ), or strictly decreasing (q 0 >q 0 ).
Summing up, our stylized demand based model offers a simple mechanism that explains why the term structure of liquidity premia varies over time and why the short and long end behave so differently. The short end is driven by the short-term risk of facing a liquidity shock, whereas a long-term risk of future trading needs determines the long end of the term structure. For the middle part of the term structure, the short-and the long-term risk matter, with the respective weights depending on the maturity of the bond. The longer (shorter) the maturity, the more important the long-(short-)term risk is.
B Empirical Results
In this section we empirically analyze economic factors driving the term structure of illiquidity premia. Our model provides assistance in selecting appropriate variables. The model makes two main predictions: (i) The long end of the term structure is determined by the long-term liquidation risk of the investor whereas the short end is driven by her current trading needs.
(ii) The influence of long-term risk increases with the time to maturity of the bond whereas the influence of the short-term risk decreases.
We proxy the long-term liquidation risk of the investor by the long-term economic outlook. The economic rationale is as follows: If the economic outlook deteriorates, it becomes more likely that the investor will get into financial difficulty in the future which might force her to sell her assets. We capture the long-term economic outlook by the Ifo business climate index, Ifo. The index is the most prominent indicator of the business climate in Germany. It is based on the survey responses of about 7,000 German firms and is published on a monthly basis by the Ifo Institute.
We use financial market volatility as our proxy for short-term trading needs.
The basic economic idea is that in periods when there is a lot of information flowing into the market and, consequently, volatility is high, forced portfolio revisions become more likely. We take two measures of volatility as explanatory variables in our empirical model. The first one, BondVola, captures the volatility of the bond market. We use the daily yields of a one-year govern-ment bond and take its standard deviation within a month as our measure
BondVola. In addition, we include a measure of stock market volatility since there are trading strategies that involve stock and bond markets at the same time. Our proxy for stock market volatility, StockVola, is the VDAX-NEW, the benchmark volatility index of the German stock market. It is based on implied volatilities of options on futures on the German stock market index DAX30, which are traded on EUREX. The VDAX-NEW refers to an option's time to maturity of 30 days and is provided by Deutsche Börse Group. We use end of month values for our study.
In addition, we use a set of control variables which might have an impact on the illiquidity premia. A first variable controls for a changing liquidity difference between the BUND and the Pfandbrief market over time. We measure market liquidity by the volume of recently issued bonds. Focussing on recently issued bonds is sensible since trading typically concentrates in on-the-run bonds as shown by Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005) among others. To capture the liquidity difference between the two markets, we calculate the ratio of the volume issued in the Pfandbrief market and the total volume issued in both markets (Pfandbrief plus BUND) over the previous six months. We construct separate measures for three different maturity ranges (< 2 years, 2 − 9 years, ≥ 9 years) which roughly capture the short end, the middle range, and the long end of the term structure. We call them Ratio short , Ratio medium , and Ratio long , respectively. The data source is Deutsche Bundesbank. Granger and Newbold (1974) . Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) show that a lagged [ Insert Table 2 about here ]
The daily yield volatility in the bond market is about 6 bp for a typical month, and the average annualized stock market volatility about 25 percent. The economic outlook (Ifo) is on average slightly below the neutral value of 100.
The ratio of issue size shows that the issuer in the Pfandbrief market typically chooses short to medium term maturities whereas the Bund clearly dominates in the long term maturities. The net investment of foreigners fluctuates around zero with a mean of 106 billion euros net inflows. The credit spread varies remarkably during the research period. Its average value is about 29 basis points.
To examine the impact of the explanatory variables on the illiquidity premia, we extend our previous VAR-model to a VAR-model with additional exogenous variables (VARX-model). We estimate one equation for each factor of the term structure of illiquidity premia.
endogenous variable in the regression ensures that the asymptotic distribution of the regression coefficients of the exogenous variables maintains its standard form.
Our regression results for the period from August 2001 to May 2007 are provided in Table 3 .
[ Insert Table 3 about here ] Table 3 shows that the illiquidity premia are mainly driven by the uncertainty the investor faces. The higher the uncertainty, the higher the illiquidity premia. However, different types of risk drive the different segments of the term structure. The short-term premium is driven by short-term trading needs as proxied by the volatility in the financial markets. In contrast, the long-term illiquidity premium is determined by the uncertainty about the long-term economic outlook as measured by the Ifo index.
In the regression equation of the short-term premium, we see a positive and significant impact of the bond market volatility and the stock market volatility.
Higher risks in the bond market and the stock market lead to higher illiquidity premia at the short end. To illustrate the magnitude of the volatility effects, we consider a simultaneous positive shock of one standard deviation in bond market and stock market volatility. In response to such a shock, the illiquidity premium increases by about 6 bp. This is almost a quarter of the average spread at the short end of the spread curve.
The illiquidity premium at the long end of the term structure is mainly driven by the Ifo index. A higher index level (which indicates a positive business climate) leads to a lower illiquidity premium; i.e., the corresponding coefficient is negative. If the Ifo index increases by one standard deviation, the long-term illiquidity premium decreases by more than 4 bp, about ten percent of the average long-term premium.
When looking at the control variables, we see that the ratio of recently issued bonds is insignificant for all three factors. Possibly, market participants do not reevaluate their notion of liquidity differences between BUND and Pfandbrief regularly over time but have a rather static view. In this case, differences in issue size show up only in the constants. In fact, the positive and highly significant constant at the long end of the term structure is consistent with a much higher issue size of long-term BUNDs compared to Pfandbriefe.
The net demand of foreign investors and the credit variable are never signifi-cant. Therefore, we have no evidence that spreads between the Pfandbrief and the BUND market are driven by credit risk or by the fact that foreigners are only aware of the Bund market segment. Finally, lagged factors are significant at the short end and the long end of the term structure, which indicates the persistence of premia over time.
Overall, our results suggest that different slopes of the term structure of the illiquidity premium reflect different regimes of short-and long-term liquidation risk. For example, if financial market volatility is low (leading to low shortterm trading needs) and the business climate is bad (leading to high longterm trading risk), we would expect an upward sloping liquidity spread curve.
Conversely, a downward sloping curve would result from high current volatility and a good business climate. Therefore, the findings thus far support the first main implication of our model.
We now turn to the second prediction of the model and analyze whether the impact of the short-term (long-term) liquidation risk on the illiquidity premium is the larger, the shorter (longer) the maturity of the bond is. We run regression models like equations (13) to (15) with maturity-specific illiquidity premia as dependent variables. Table 4 provides the corresponding results for maturities between three months and 15 years.
[ Insert Table 4 about here ]
The results suggest a smooth transition from short-maturity premia to mediumand long-term premia. Financial market volatility becomes the more important for the illiquidity premium the shorter the maturity of a bond. Longer-term economic prospects, however, gain importance for bonds with longer maturities. The results for the three-months' premium and the 15-years' premium closely resemble the results for the short-term factor and the long-term factor.
Thus, our empirical results also support the second main implication of the our stylized model.
V Conclusions
The German bond market offers a unique testing ground for liquidity studies:
Essentially default-free bonds that only differ with respect to their liquidity are traded along the entire maturity spectrum. In this paper, we take advantage of this situation to examine the term structure of illiquidity premia. In a novel empirical approach, we compare the spread between yields of the liquid BUND market and the relatively less liquid Pfandbrief market for bonds of different maturities. This spread reflects the illiquidity premium of the Pfandbrief market as compared to the BUND market for bonds of different maturities, i.e., the term structure of illiquidity premia.
Our empirical analysis of the dynamics of the term structure of illiquidity premia over time delivers several novel findings: The term structure of illiquidity premia is not constant over time -neither with respect to its level nor to its shape. We observe increasing term structures, but also flat or decreasing term structures resulting from a changing economic environment.The short end and the long end of the term structure of illiquidity premia are strictly separated,
i.e., we find no significant correlation or spill-over effects. This result suggests that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure. We propose a stylized theoretical model which is able to capture the dynamics of the term structure. In this model, the illiquidity premia are determined by trading needs of investors. The model predicts that the long end of the term structure is determined by the long-term liquidation risk of the investor whereas the short end is driven by her current trading needs. The influence of long-term risk increases with the time to maturity of the bond whereas the influence of the short-term risk decreases. The data provide strong support for both hypotheses: While the short end of the term structure of illiquidity premia is driven by short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook. The short-term liquidation risk becomes more important for the illiquidity premium the shorter the maturity of a bond is. Long-term economic prospects, however, gain importance for bonds with longer maturities. (2) -(4) of the main text. Long(t) ≡ β
, and Shape(t) ≡ β P F 2t − β BU 2t are the long-term factor, the short-term factor, and the shape factor of the term structure of illiquidity premia, respectively. The data period is January 2000 to May 2007 (87 observations). Standard errors of the coefficients are given in parentheses. They are based on Newey and West's (1987) covariance matrix estimator with ten lags. 
, and Shape(t) ≡ β P F 2t − β BU 2t are the long-term factor, the short-term factor, and the shape factor of the term structure of illiquidity premia, respectively. The exogenous variables are defined as in Table  2 . The data period is August 2001 to May 2007 (70 observations). Standard errors of the coefficients are given in parentheses. They are based on Newey and West's (1987) covariance matrix estimator with ten lags. This table shows the results of a regression model similar to equation (10). In contrast to equation (10), the endogenous variable is now the illiquidity premium for bonds of a fixed maturity. We look at illiquidity premia for maturities between three months and fifteen years. The exogenous variables are defined as in Table 2 . We use the ratio based on short term bonds (< 2 years) as an explanatory variable for the 1-month and 1-year premia, the ratio based on medium term bonds (2 − 9 years) for the 5-year premia, and the ratio based on long term bonds (≥ 9 years) for the 10-years and 15-years premia. In addition, we include two lagged values of each illiquidity factor. Coefficients of the lagged illiquidity factors are not reported. The data period is August 2001 to May 2007 (70 observations). Standard errors of the coefficients are given in parentheses. They are based on Newey and West's (1987) This figure shows the development of the term structure factors over time. The solid lines depict the factors for the BUND market and the dashed lines the factors for the Pfandbrief market. Part A provides the estimates of the long-term factors (β 0t ), Part B the ones for the short-term factors (β 0t + β 1t ) and Part C the ones for the shape factors (β 2t ). Estimation was carried out by minimizing the sum of squared yield differences according to equation (1) for end of month yields with maturities of 3 and 6 months and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and This figure shows the development of the short-term and the long-term illiquidity premia over time. The dark line depicts the short-term illiquidity premium, which equals the difference between the short-term factors for the Pfandbrief market and the BUND market (β 
